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## **National Intelligence Daily** (Cable)

18 January 1982

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USSR:	Call for	· US-Soviet	Summit		• •		•	• •	•	•	•	4
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POLAND: Proposed Price Incress	ses Postponed
//The government has postponed increases because it fears public red has criticized martial law practices, statement by its Ambassador to the UI two or three weeks. The intense West continues.//	, and the regime has denied the K that martial law may end in
The regime appears to be a future economic policies as about clearly does not feel secure	out its political course. e enough to implement the
sharp increases officially propublic discussion already had be of the month.	the period for
pre-Solidarity days the populate and violently to price increase moderate than those now under o	is also aware that in tion reacted spontaneously es that were <u>far more</u>
Glemp Speaks Out Again	
Archbishop Glemp yesterday criticism of martial law. He as of continuing arrests, not relemaintaining its campaign of extended that these actions if the people.	accused the authorities easing the detainees, and tracting loyalty oaths.
Comment: Glemp's criticist influence the political and economical states of the political and economical polish Bishops will meet this wake a strong statement warning that they cannot expect cooperating continue their harsh practiculd stiffen the resolve of resee the Church as their enemy.	to parliament next Monday. week, and they, also, may g the government leaders ation from the Church if tices. Such pressure
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## The West German Debate

Public reaction to the bitter West German Bundestag debate on Thursday carried over into the weekend. Chancellor Schmidt on Saturday told a Bavarian audience composed of Socialist Democratic Party members that despite foreign criticism he would hold to his policy of restraint and cooperation with the East. Schmidt stated that martial law was "probably the slightly lesser evil for Poland," given the threat of Soviet intervention.

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The opposition, meanwhile, on Saturday continued to use repression in Poland as an argument against Schmidt's detente policies. A spokesman referred to Schmidt's pursuit of detente as "a debilitating drug, sapping the will to self-defense."

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USSR: Call for US-Soviet Summit		
//The deputy director of the prestigious I Economy and International Relations, Oleg Bykov, cated a meeting between Presidents Reagan and Br effective way of establishing a more useful poli	on Thursday ad Pezhnev as the m	vo- ost
		Bykov
asserted that the problems besetting US- must be kept "in proportion," and urged countries emphasize arms control and res confrontations. He claimed that agreeme chemical and radiological weapons and nu concurrence in a conference on "military Europe are nearly completed and could pr steps toward a summit meeting.//	that the two traint to ave ents on limiting clear tests and detente" in	ert .ng ind
//Bykov said that Soviet policymake events in only US-Soviet terms as depict propagandists and that they understand to such as Poland do not arise mainly becau He indicated Soviet officials regard the as a full-fledged conservative but not a like some of those around him.//	ed by Soviet hat problems se of US acti	ons.
Comment: Although Bykov's views regofficial reflection of attitudes held by scholars and policy planners, they may is that will be raised next week by Foreign in his talks with Secretary of State Hair interest in summitry voiced by Bykov alrediscussed on Moscow television and is lincreased attention in Soviet media.	senior Soviendicate posite Minister Grogon The renew eady has been	et zions omyko ved
The call for arms control and summit advocated by Brezhnev 11 months ago in his speech and appears aimed at exploring possents in bilateral relations following to of negotiations on INF limitations and to of martial law in Poland. By alleging to control agreements could be achieved rapplies the US condition that adequate presa summit could be accommodated. In bypa of linkage, he apparently is testing whe on arms control in the President's speech can be actively pursued despite intervent.	is party cong ssible improve he resumption he imposition hat some arms idly, Bykov i parations pro- ssing the issether the emph th in November	gress ye-  in
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SYRIA-USSR: Foreign Ministers' Meeting

The restrained tone of the joint communique from the meeting last week between the Soviet and Syrian Foreign Ministers suggests that Syria did not get all the Soviet political and military support -- on the Golan Heights issue, in particular -- that it was seeking. Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam claimed in an interview on Friday that "measures to counter" Israel's annexation of the Golan were discussed. The communique, however, only condemned the Israeli move and noted in general terms the "need to halt the dangerous development of the situation" in the Middle East. It did not call for countermeasures or even cite the UN sanctions that The two sides called for a Damascus has been seeking. continued strengthening of cooperation in all areas, "including the military field," but the Svrian delegation did not include military officials.

Judging from the public record of the Comment: meeting, Damascus will not be satisfied with the results. There is nothing to suggest that Khaddam made any progress in obtaining the "strategic cooperation" agreement he had earlier stated that Syria was interested in. Although Soviet Armed Forces Chief of Staff Ogarkov's participation in the meeting seemed designed to signify continuing Soviet military support for Syria, the routine language in the communique on defense cooperation implied no new commitments from Moscow. The unusual emphasis on the "utmost importance" of political consultations on the Middle East situation might be an indication of Damascus's displeasure with Moscow's slowness in agreeing to the meeting, but it could also reflect Soviet concern that Syria not take precipitate actions without prior consul-

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ISRAEL: Inflation Slows	
The Israeli Government announced on Friday that the inflation rate was reduced to 102 percent for 1981 from 133 percent in 1980.	, 25X
Comment: Large subsidy expenditures to hold the line on prices, particularly prior to the election last June, are the major reason for the improvement. Inflation probably will increase this year because the government has not dealt with the underlying causes—increasing	(
wages, high consumer demand, and the growing budget deficit.	25 <b>X</b>
Debate among government officials and intellectuals over economic policy has intensified recently in the face of a weakening balance-of-payments position. Some critics are arguing for faster growth and accelerated economic reform in order to encourage export industries and weed out unprofitable enterprises. Ferenc Havasi, the Politburo member responsible for economic policy, contends, on the other hand, that Hungary should continue its policy of slow growth and gradual reform and accept the trade deficit this year as the cost of maintaining	25 25
living standards.	25 <b>X</b>
Comment: Cutbacks in deliveries of oil from the USSR and fear of further reductions in raw materials shipments may have helped intensify the debate. Havasi has won such arguments before and is in a good position to do so again. He can argue that accepting the critics' program would lead, in the short term at least, to increased inflation, more unemployment, and larger trade deficits. Pressure from the critics, nonetheless, could prompt Budapest to speed up parts of its reform program.	۳
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